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A Code Equivalence between
Secure Network and Index Coding
Lawrence Ong, Jörg Kliewer, Badri N. Vellambi, and Phee Lep Yeoh
Abstract—A code equivalence between index coding and net-
work coding was established, which shows that any index-coding
instance can be mapped to a network-coding instance, for which
any index code can be translated to a network code with the same
decoding-error performance, and vice versa. Also, any network-
coding instance can be mapped to an index-coding instance
with a similar code translation. In this paper, we extend the
equivalence to secure index coding and secure network coding,
where eavesdroppers are present in the networks, and any code
construction needs to guarantee security constraints in addition
to decoding-error performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, equivalence results in information theory and
network coding have been of significant interest to the commu-
nity. Such reduction results uniquely map one communication
problem to another equivalent problem that is potentially easier
to study than the original problem. Some of the equivalence
results already established include those between instances
of multiple-unicast network coding and those of (i) multiple-
multicast network coding [1], (ii) secure network coding [2],
and (iii) index coding [3, 4].
This paper focuses on the equivalence between index coding
and network coding. Index coding [5] considers a one-hop
network where a sender conveys multiple messages to multiple
receivers through a noiseless broadcast medium, where each
receiver wants some messages from the sender, but already
knows some other messages. On the other hand, network cod-
ing [6] considers a network of interconnected links with fixed
capacities, where multiple senders send multiple messages to
multiple receivers through these links.
Although these two problems appear different prima facie,
the following equivalence between them has been demon-
strated [3, 4]: for any index-coding instance (specified by what
each receiver has and wants), one can construct an equivalence
network-coding instance (specified by how the links are con-
nected, their capacities, and all sender and receiver locations),
such that any index code (specified by the encoding function of
the sender and the decoding functions of all the receivers) for
the index-coding instance can be mapped to a network code
for the same message sizes (specified by the encoding function
of all nodes in the network, and the decoding functions of
all receivers) for the network-coding instance, and vice versa.
Similarly, for any network-coding instance, we can construct
an equivalent index-coding instance with code mapping in both
directions.
This work is supported by ARC grants FT140100219 and DE140100420,
and US NSF grants CNS-1526547 and CCF-1439465.
The equivalence was first shown for linear codes [4] and
then for non-linear codes (which include linear codes as a
special case) [3]. Furthermore, the equivalence has been shown
for any (zero and non-zero) decoding error probability, that is,
if the probability of decoding error for the network code is
bounded above by a given value, the mapped index code also
has this property, and vice versa.
In this paper, we further investigate if the equivalence
holds if we impose another constraint besides decodability:
security. Separately, the secure version of index coding and
that of network coding have been studied, in which additional
parties, eavesdroppers, are present, and they attempt to obtain
some information on the messages being communicated. More
specifically, the secure version of index coding [7] includes a
number of eavesdroppers each of whom (i) knows a subset
of messages; (ii) listens to the sender’s broadcast; and (iii)
attempts to decode some messages. The secure version of
network coding [8] includes a number of eavesdropper each
of whom (i) can listen to a subset of links; and (ii) attempts
to decode some messages. A secure index code or a secure
network code must prevent eavesdroppers from knowing the
messages (where knowing is quantified by the information-
theoretic security measure [9, Ch 22]), in addition to guaran-
teeing that all receivers can obtain their requested messages
(by bounding the probability of decoding error).
The non-secure equivalence results [3, 4] do not trivially
apply to the secure version of the problems. In particular,
we pointed out [10] that equating the eavesdropper settings
in secure network coding and secure index coding is not
straightforward, as the eavesdroppers in the two problems
have different characteristics (as described in the previous
paragraph). Also, the non-secure equivalence was proven
for deterministic code mapping. But randomised encoding is
inevitable in some secure network-coding instances [8], and
we have shown [10] that the non-secure equivalence breaks
down for randomised encoding.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we extend the code equivalence between index
and network coding to the secured version. Informally, in
Theorem 1, we show that any secure index-coding instance I1
can be mapped to a secure network-coding instance N1, such
that any code for I1 can be translated to a code for N1 (and
vice versa) with the same error decoding and security criteria.
In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.1, we show that any secure
network-coding instance N2 can be mapped to a secure index-
coding instance I2 such that
21) any code for N2 can be translated to a code for I2 with
the same error decoding and security criteria;
2) any code for I2
a) that has zero decoding error can be translated to code
for N2 with the same error decoding and security
criteria,
b) that has non-zero decoding error and is linear can
be translated to a linear code for N2 with a security
criterion that grows linearly in the codelength, and
a decoding criterion that does not grow with the
codelength. This implies that that strongly-secure index
codes map to weakly-secure network codes.
For all cases except 2b, we establish an equivalence that
preserves both the decodability and security criteria.
B. Approaches
To obtain the aforementioned results, we utilised the fol-
lowing ingredients:
I.1 a mapping between secure index-coding configurations
and secure network-coding configurations, which speci-
fies what each user and eavesdropper has access to and
attempt to decode;
I.2 a mapping between index codes and network codes; and
I.3 analysis of the performance of the mapped index code,
in terms of decoding error and security criteria, given the
performance of the original network code; and vice versa.
For I.1, extending the configuration mapping proposed by
Effros et al. [3], we propose a mapping for the eavesdroppers.
Briefly, for each eavesdropper in a index-coding instance, who
knows a subset of messages, the corresponding eavesdropper
in the network-coding instance will have access to a particular
link as well as all the outgoing links from the source nodes of
the corresponding messages. In the other direction, for each
eavesdropper in a network-coding instance, who has access to
a subset of links, the corresponding eavesdropper in the index-
coding instance will have the messages corresponding to the
links as side information.
Note that unlike the mapping of the users (the number
of users always increase when we map one instance to the
other) and the messages (the number of messages always
increase from when we map a network-coding instance to
an index-coding instance), the number of eavesdroppers in
both instances remains the same, and there is a one-to-one
correspondence among the eavesdroppers in both problems.
For I.2, we build on the code mapping proposed by Effros
et al. [3]. At first sight, this mapping fails when we map a
randomised network code to a randomised index code. To
rectify this issue, we introduce the concept of an augmented
secure network-coding instance to capture the randomness in
the encoding. This increases the number of messages in the
network-coding instance, but converts all randomised encoding
functions to deterministic encoding functions.
For I.3, difficulties arise in obtaining an equivalence for non-
zero error and leakage due to the fact that the eavesdroppers
in both instances observe different signals: messages for index
coding and functions of messages transmitted on links for
network coding. If decoding error at the receivers is allowed,
these two types of messages do not necessarily match, making
it difficult to guarantee the same amount of leakage.
This problem is even more severe for case 2b mentioned in
Section I-A, in which we need to select certain parameters for
the index code to obtain the required network code, and the
parameters must simultaneously satisfy both error and leakage
criteria. To obtain the above equivalence result, we use the
hypothesis that decoding is correct (1− ǫ) fraction of the time
for I2 to bound the distance between the probability mass
functions (pmf) of the messages in both instances.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND NOTATION
For a strictly ordered set S = {s1, s2, . . . s |S |}, with a
binary relation < where s1 < s2 · · · < s |S | , let XS
def
=
(Xs1, Xs2, . . . , Xs|S |). Consider a directed graph G = (V, E)
with node setV and edge set E. For an edge e = (u → v) ∈ E,
u, v ∈ V, its tail is tail(e)
def
= u, and its head is head(e)
def
= v.
For any node v ∈ V, the set of incoming edges is denoted by
in(v)
def
= {e ∈ E : head(e) = v}, and the set of outgoing edges
by out(v)
def
= {e ∈ E : tail(e) = v}. For any positive integer
a ∈ Z+, denote [a]
def
= {1, 2, . . . , a}. For two ordered sets of
discrete random variables XS1 and YS2 , XS1
d
= YS2 means that
they have the same probability mass functions (pmf), and all
corresponding pairs of random variables (one with index from
S1 and another one from S2) have the same range/alphabet.
A. Secure network coding
1) Network-coding instances: We follow Chan and Grant’s
secure network-coding definition [11]. It includes Bhattad and
Narayanan’s weakly secure network-coding definition [12] and
Cai and Yeung’s strongly secure network coding definition [8]
as special cases. A secure network-coding instance, denoted
by N = (G,C,W), is defined as follows:
• G = (V, E) is an acyclic directed graph with vertex setV
and edge set E.∗ Each edge e ∈ E is a directed noiseless
communication link with a capacity of ce ∈ R
+
0
def
= [0,∞)
bits per use. This means that if the link is used n ∈ Z+
times, vertex tail(e) can send a message X ∈ [2 ⌊cen⌋ ]
to vertex head(e) with no error.
• C = (S,O,D) is the connection requirement. The strictly
ordered set S is the collection of source-message indices,
where the messages are denoted by {Xs : s ∈ S}.
The source-location mapping O : S → V specifies the
unique originating node O(s) for source message Xs . The
destination-location mapping D : S → 2V specifies
the set of nodes D(s) that requires message Xs . Note
that multiple source messages can originate from a node,
multiple destination nodes can demand a particular source
message, and a destination node can demand multiple
source messages.
• W = ((Ar,Br ) : r ∈ R) defines the eavesdropping pattern
a set of eavesdroppers indexed by R. Each eavesdropper
r ∈ R observes the set of links Br ⊆ E and tries to
∗Here, E is a strictly ordered set, with natural ordering by the head and
tail vertices.
3reconstruct a subset of source messages indexed by Ar ⊆
S, i.e., XAr .
We assume that vertices with no incoming links are orig-
inating nodes for some source messages, and vertices with
no outgoing links are destinations for some source messages.
Otherwise, they can be deleted without any consequence.
2) Deterministic network codes: Given (G,C), let the
source messages {Xs : s ∈ S} be mutually independent,
and each message Xs be distributed over a finite alphabet Xs
according to some pmf pXs .
A deterministic network code (E,D) consists of a collection
of deterministic encoding functions E = {ee : e ∈ E} for the
edges, and deterministic decoding functions D = {du : u ∈
V} for the vertices satisfying the following: Consider n ∈ Z+
network uses, meaning that each link is used n times.
• The local encoding function ee for edge e takes in
all incoming messages in(tail(e)) to node tail(e)
and source messages XO−1(tail(e)) originating at node
tail(e), and outputs a random variable associated with
link e, denoted by Xe ∈ [2
⌊cen⌋ ].
Given that G is acyclic, each edge message Xe can
be written as a function of source messages originating
from its predecessors, denoted by ge. This is known as
the global encoding function, and it can be recursively
calculated (following the topology of the graph) using
(i) ge = ee(XO−1(tail(e))) if tail(e) has no incoming
links, and (ii) ge = ee(gin(tail(e)), XO−1(tail(e))). So, in
general, we write ge(XS) for all e ∈ E.
• The decoding function du for a node u ∈ V takes in
random variables associated with links in(u) and source
messages originating at node u, and outputs an estimate
of X{s∈S:u∈D(s)} , denoted by X
(u)
{s∈S:u∈D(s)}
.
Let the probability of the event that one or more destination
nodes make a decoding error be denoted as
Pe = Pr{X
(u)
{s∈S:u∈D(s)}
, X{s∈S:u∈D(s)} for at least
one destination node u}. (1)
For some ǫ ∈ R+
0
, a network code (E,D) said to have at
most ǫ error if and only if Pe ≤ ǫ .
When η = 0, we say that the code allows perfect decoding.
3) Randomised network codes: A network code is said to
be randomised if there exists an edge function ee that is not
a deterministic function of the random variables associated
with in(tail(e)) and source messages originating at node
tail(e).
Any randomised network code can be implemented by
an equivalent deterministic network code by generating an
independent random variable Zu at each node u ∈ V, and
defining a deterministic map from Xin(tail(e)), XO−1(tail(e)),
and Ztail(e) to Xe for each edge e ∈ E [11]. These random
variables {Zu : u ∈ V} are assumed to be mutually indepen-
dent, and are often referred to as random keys.
A randomised network code (E′,D) is similar to a deter-
ministic network code (E,D), except that each edge encoding
function e′e is a deterministic function of (i) random variables
associated with in(tail(e)), (ii) source messages originating
at node tail(e), and (iii) the random key Ztail(e).
4) Secure network codes: A deterministic or randomised
network code (E,D) for (G,M) is said to be secure against
an eavesdropping pattern W if each eavesdropper r gains not
more than a specific amount of information about XAr that it
attempts to reconstruct after observing XBr on the links it has
access to. Formally, the information leakage to eavesdropper r
is calculated as I(XAr ; XBr ).
For some η ∈ R+
0
, a network code is said to be have at most
η leakage if and only if
I(XAr ; XBr ) ≤ η, for all r ∈ R. (2)
When η = 0, we say that the code is perfectly secure.
5) Secure network-coding feasibility: A secure network-
coding instance N is said to be (S∗, (pXs : s ∈ S
∗), ǫ, η, n)-
feasible if and only if there exists a joint pmf pXS\S∗ =∏
s∈S\S∗ pXs for messages XS\S∗ and a secure network code
over n network uses with at most ǫ error and η leakage for
the message joint pmf pXS (xS) = pXS∗ (xS∗)pXS\S∗ (xS\S∗ ).
Note that our message setup is sufficiently general, which
include the problem formulations:
F.1 Given a joint message pmf pXS , we want to find the
minimum number of network uses n required to achieve
certain decoding and leakage requirements.
F.2 Let each message Xs be uniformly distributed over |Xs |,
and define Rs
def
= (log2 |Xs |)/n as the average message rate
per network use. Given a number of network uses n, we
want to find rate tuples RS that satisfy certain decoding
and leakage requirements.
F.3 For each message index s ∈ S, consider a pmf ps
over [Ls] for some Ls ∈ Z
+. For every s ∈ S, let
Xs = (Xs1, Xs2, . . . , Xsm ) where each Xsi are indepen-
dently distributed according to ps . This means |Xs | = L
m
s .
We want to find the maximum source-channel rate m/n
that satisfies certain decoding and leakage requirements.
For formulations F.2 and F.3 above, one can fix the rate
(RS for F.2 or m/n for F.3) and find a sequence of network
codes with increasing n to get following notions of security
criteria:
Strong security: lim
n→∞
I(XAr ; XBr ) = 0, ∀r ∈ R,
Weak security: lim
n→∞
1
ℓ
I(XAr ; XBr ) = 0, ∀r ∈ R.
where ℓ = n for F.2, and ℓ = m for F.3.
B. Secure index coding
1) Secure index-coding instances: We follow Dau,
Skachek, and Chee’s secure index-coding definition [7]. A se-
cure index-coding instance, denoted by I = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {(Wˆt, Hˆt ) :
t ∈ Tˆ }, Wˆ), is defined as follows:
• Sˆ is a strictly ordered set of indices of source messages
available at a sender.
• Tˆ is an strictly ordered set of receiver indices.
• Wˆt is the set of the indices of the messages required by
receiver t ∈ Tˆ .
4• Hˆt is the set of indices of the messages known a priori
to receiver t ∈ Tˆ .
• Wˆ = ((Aˆr, Bˆr ) : r ∈ Rˆ) is the eavesdropping pattern.
Each eavesdropper r ∈ Rˆ has access to the codeword
broadcast by the sender and a subset of the messages
XBˆr
, and tries to reconstruct XAˆr , where Aˆr, Bˆr ⊆ Sˆ,
and Aˆr ∩ Bˆr = ∅.
2) Deterministic index codes: Let the messages {Xˆs : s ∈
Sˆ} be mutually independent, and for each s ∈ Sˆ, Xˆs be dis-
tributed over a finite alphabet Xˆs according to some pmf pXˆs .
A deterministic index code (eˆ, Dˆ), where Dˆ = {dˆt : t ∈ Tˆ }),
consists of
• a deterministic encoding function eˆ by the sender, which
takes in random variables Xˆ
Sˆ
and outputs a random
variable Xˆb = eˆ(XˆSˆ) ∈ [2
nˆ], for some nˆ ∈ Z+, and
• a deterministic decoding function dˆt for each receiver t ∈
Tˆ , which takes in the sender’s codeword Xˆb and its prior
messages Xˆ
Hˆt
and outputs an estimate of the messages
XˆWˆt
it requires, denoted by Xˆ
(t)
Wˆt
.
Remark 1: This index-code definition is consistent with
the index-coding literature [13]–[16], but is different from
that by Effros et al., where the sender transmits Xb ∈ [2
cˆbn],
and cˆb is then chosen to be a function of the link capacities
of the equivalent network-coding instance. Our choice results
in a scaling factor of the alphabet size for the index-coding
messages, but avoids the issue of 2cˆbn not being an integer.
As with network coding, let the probability of the event
that one or more destination nodes make a decoding error be
denoted as
Pˆe
def
= Pr{Xˆ
(t)
Wˆt
, XˆWˆt
for at least one destination node t ∈ Tˆ }.
(3)
For some ǫ ∈ R+
0
, an index code (eˆ, Dˆ) said to have at most
ǫ error if and only if Pˆe ≤ ǫ .
3) Randomised index codes: A randomised index code
(eˆ′, Dˆ) is defined similar to the deterministic index codes
except that the sender’s encoding function takes in an inde-
pendent random key Zˆ in addition to Xˆ
Sˆ
. Unlike the model by
Mojahedian, Aref, and Gohari [17], the randomness allowed in
the encoding in our setting is generated locally at the sender,
and is not shared with the receivers or the eavesdroppers.
4) Secure index codes: A deterministic or randomised index
code (eˆ, Dˆ) is said to be secure against the eavesdropping
pattern Wˆ if each eavesdropper r ∈ Rˆ gains no information
about the message set XˆAˆr it tries to reconstruct by observing
the sender’s codeword Xˆb and its side information XˆBˆr .
Similar to network coding, the leakage to eavesdropper r is
calculated as I(XˆAˆr ; Xˆb, XˆBˆr ). For any η ∈ R
+
0
, we say that
an index code has at most η leakage if and only if
I(XˆAˆr ; Xˆb, XˆBˆr ) ≤ η, for all r ∈ Rˆ . (4)
Also, when η = 0, we say that the index code is perfectly
secure.
5) Secure index-coding feasibility: Similar to the feasibility
notion for secure network coding, a secure index-coding
instance I is said to be (Sˆ∗, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ
∗), ǫ, η, n)-feasible
if and only if there exists a joint pmf p
XˆSˆ\Sˆ∗
=
∏
s∈Sˆ\Sˆ∗
pXˆs
for messages Xˆ
Sˆ\Sˆ∗
and a secure network code of length n
with at most ǫ error and η leakage for the message joint
pmf p
XˆSˆ
(xˆ
Sˆ
) = p
XˆSˆ∗
(xˆ
Sˆ∗
)p
XˆSˆ\Sˆ∗
(xˆ
Sˆ\Sˆ∗
). The general message
definition here also allows us to define different index-coding
problem formulations similar to those for network coding
mentioned earlier.
III. MAPPING FROM SECURE INDEX CODING TO SECURE
NETWORK CODING
A. Index-to-network coding configuration mapping
Given a configuration I = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {(Wˆt, Hˆt ) : t ∈ Tˆ }, Wˆ) of
a secure index-coding instance. Let Sˆ = [k] and Tˆ = [ℓ] for
some positive integers k and ℓ.
We follow the mapping for G and C by Effros et al. [3]:
• The graphG = (V, E) consists of k+ℓ+2 vertices labelled
as V = {s1, s2, . . . , sk, t1, t2, . . . , tℓ, 1, 2}. For each i ∈ Sˆ,
vertex si has an outgoing link to vertex 1 and to each
vertex in {tj : i ∈ Hˆj }. Each of these links from vertex si
are of sufficiently large capacity. Vertex 1 has a link of
capacity 1 bit per use to vertex 2, and vertex 2 has a link
of capacity 1 bit per use to each vertex in {ti : i ∈ Tˆ }.
• The connection requirement C consists of the following:
S = Sˆ. For each message Xi , i ∈ S, the source locations
are O(i) = si , i.e., the message Xi originates at vertex si ,
and is destined for D(i) = {tj : i ∈ Wˆj }.
Note that by construction, for each i ∈ Tˆ ,
• Wˆi = { j ∈ S : ti ∈ D( j)}, that means, the requested
messages are the same in both instances; and
• Hˆi = { j ∈ S : (sj → ti) ∈ E}, that means, side
information in I manifests itself in incoming links from
corresponding source nodes in N.
Also, the vertices V \ {t1, . . . , tℓ} are not the destinations of
any source message.
We propose the following mappingW for the eavesdroppers:
• The eavesdropping pattern W is defined as R = Rˆ, Br =
{(1 → 2), {out(si) : i ∈ Bˆr }}, and Ar = Aˆr , for each
r ∈ Rˆ.
Note that different from the mapping C, we propose that the
side information of an eavesdropper in I be mapped to an
eavesdropper in N having access to all outgoing links from
the corresponding source nodes as well as the link 1 → 2.
Figure 1 depicts an example of such a mapping.
B. Equivalence results
With the above conversion, we now state an equivalence
between these two instances:
Theorem 1: Let I be a secure index-coding instance, and
N be the corresponding secure network-coding instance using
the index-to-network coding mapping. For any ǫ, η ∈ R+
0
, and
n ∈ Z+, the instance I is (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible
if and only if N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible with
deterministic coding functions for vertices {si : i ∈ Sˆ}, where
Xˆ
Sˆ
d
= XS .
The theorem above preserves the message size, as well as
the decodability and security criteria. We will prove Theorem 1
in the next two sections.
5Sender
Xˆ1, Xˆ2, Xˆ3, Xˆ4
Xˆb
2Xˆ31Xˆ2 Xˆ1, Xˆ4 3 Xˆ4 rˆ
Xˆ1 Xˆ2, Xˆ4 Xˆ3 Xˆ2
(a) A secure index-coding instance I, where an eavesdropper rˆ
has access to the broadcast message Xˆb, side information Xˆ4,
and tries to reconstruct Xˆ2
1
2
1
t1 t2 t3 r
s1
X1
s2
X2
s3
X3
s4
X4
X1 (X2, X4) X3 X2
1
1 1
(b) A secure network-coding instance N, where an eavesdrop-
per r has access to link (1 → 2), all outgoing links from node
s4, and tries to reconstruct X2. The capacity of all links given
by thick arrows is 1 bit per channel use
Fig. 1: A secure index-coding instance I and its corresponding secure network-coding instance N
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 – THE FORWARD DIRECTION
We will now prove Theorem 1 for the forward direction,
that is I is (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible ⇒ N is (S, (pXs :
s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible.
A. Code construction
Let (eˆ, Dˆ) be a secure index code (which can be randomised)
for I that is (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible. We now adapt
the code mapping by El Rouayheb et al. and Effros et al. to
obtain a network code for N. The decoding fidelity for this
code mapping has been proven for deterministic codes. Here,
we will prove that this code mapping also satisfy
• the same decoding criterion for randomised index codes,
and
• the security criteria.
The secure network code (E,D) is as follows:
• Set a deterministic edge function esi (XO−1(si )) =
esi (Xi) = Xi for all outgoing edges from each vertex
in {si : i ∈ S}. This is possible since vertex si is
the originating vertex for the message Xi , and the link
capacity is sufficiently large.
• Set X1→2 = e1→2(·) = eˆ(XS, Z1) ∈ [2
n] for the edge
1 → 2. Z1 (which is the random key used in the encoding
function of vertex 1 in N) is independent of all the source
messages XS and has the same distribution as Zˆ (which is
the random key in the encoding function in I). This means
(XS, Z)
d
= (XˆS, Zˆ). Again this is possible as vertex 1
receives XS from the incoming links, and the link (1 →
2) and all outgoing links from vertex 2 have the capacity
of n bits per use.
• Set Xe = ee(·) = X1→2 for all e ∈ out(2)
• Set dti (·) = dˆi(·) for all i ∈ Tˆ , and du = 0 for all other
vertices.
B. Decoding criteria
Note that, in the network-coding instance N, only receivers
{ti: i ∈ Tˆ } need to decode messages, and each of them
receives eˆ(XS, Z1) and XHˆi over its coming links. These are
the same functions that each receiver i ∈ Tˆ receives in the
index-coding instance I. By using the same decoding functions
for receivers {ti: i ∈ Tˆ } in N, if Pˆe ≤ ǫ for I, we also must
have Pe ≤ ǫ for N.
C. Security criteria
Each eavesdropper r ∈ R in N has access to messages XBr
on the link set Br consisting of
• link (1 → 2), which carries X1→2 = eˆ(XS, Z), and
• links {out(si) : i ∈ Bˆr }, which carry messages XBˆr ,
because by construction, each outgoing link from node
si carries Xi .
Now, we know that, for I, I(XˆAˆr ; eˆ(XˆSˆ, Zˆ), XˆBˆr ) ≤ η, for all
r ∈ Rˆ. Since (XS, Z)
d
= (XˆS, Zˆ) by construction, we have
(XAr , eˆ(XS, Z), XBˆr )
d
= (XˆAr , eˆ(XˆS, Zˆ), XˆBˆr ) (5a)
= (XˆAˆr , eˆ(XˆSˆ, Zˆ), XˆBˆr ). (5b)
For N, we now show that
I(XAr ; XBr ) = I(XAr ; eˆ(XS, Z), XBˆr ) (6a)
= I(XˆAˆr ; eˆ(XˆSˆ, Zˆ), XˆBˆr ) (6b)
≤ η. (6c)
where (6b) follows from (5b) with a change of variables (from
non-hatted to hatted). This completes the security proof for N.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 – THE BACKWARD DIRECTION
We will now prove Theorem 1 for the backward direction,
that is, N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible⇒ I is (Sˆ, (pXˆs :
s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible.
A. Code construction
Let (E,D) be a secure network code for N that is (Sˆ, (pXˆs :
s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible such that the outgoing links from the
sources {si : i ∈ S} are each deterministic functions of the
source messages Xi , i.e., for each i ∈ S, we have
Xe = ee(Xi), for each e ∈ out(si). (7)
6This means, for a given message realisation, the only random-
ness in the code is due to Z1 and Z2, which are the independent
random keys injected by nodes 1 and 2 respectively (refer to
the definition of network codes). This implies that a global
encoding function g1→2(XS, Z1) can be written for the link
1 → 2.
We see that as Z2 is independent of all {XS, Z1}, we have
the following Markov chain:
XWi − (g1→2(XS, Z1), {esj→ti (Xj ) : j ∈ Hˆi})
− (e2→ti (g1→2(XS, Z1), Z2), {esj→ti (Xj ) : j ∈ Hˆi}), (8)
for each i ∈ S. Recall that ge is the global encoding
function of ee. By data-processing inequality, the probability
of decoding error Pe cannot increase if we replace X2→ti with
X1→2 in each receiver ti’s observations. Also, by definition,
none of the links {2 → ti : i ∈ Tˆ } can be accessed by any
eavesdropper. Consequently, for any network code N (mapped
from an index code I) that is (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible,
setting
X2→ti = X1→2, for all i ∈ Tˆ , (9)
will result in another (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible network
code for N. This is because doing so can only improve
decodability, and will not affect security. Without loss of
rate performance, for the remaining of this section, we will
consider network codes only of the form (9).
With this, we now construct the required secure index code
(eˆ, Dˆ). The construction is the same by El Rouayheb et al. and
Effros et al., except for a modification that allows the network
code to be randomised, where the randomness is restricted
to node 1 (manifested in Z1). For this code construction, an
equivalence under the decoding criterion has been proven for
deterministic codes. Here, we will prove an equivalence under
both decoding and security criteria for randomised codes.
The index code is chosen as follows:
• Select Zˆ , such that (Xˆ
Sˆ
, Zˆ)
d
= (XS, Z1).
• Set the sender’s transmitted code to be eˆ(·) =
g1→2(XˆSˆ, Zˆ) ∈ [2
n].
• Set the decoding function of receiver i ∈ Tˆ to be dˆi =
dti (Xˆ1→2, (esj→ti (Xˆj ) : j ∈ Hˆi)). This is feasible since
receiver i observes eˆ(·) = Xˆ1→2 from the sender and has
side information Xˆ
Hˆi
.
B. Decoding criteria
For the network-coding instance N, where each receiver ti
tries to decode XWˆi from g1→2(XS, Z1) and {esj→ti (Xj ) : j ∈
Hˆi}, we have Pe ≤ ǫ . For the index-coding instance I, since
each receiver i tries to decode XˆWˆi from Xˆb = g1→2(XˆSˆ, Zˆ)
and {esj→ti (Xˆj ) : j ∈ Hˆi}, and (XˆSˆ, Zˆ)
d
= (XS, Z1), we must
have Pˆe ≤ ǫ .
C. Security criteria
From the security condition of N, we have I(XAr ; XBr ) <
η, where Br = {(1 → 2), {out(si) : i ∈ Bˆr }} are the indices
of all outgoing links from sources nodes {si : i ∈ Bˆr } plus
the link 1 → 2, which are observed by the eavesdropper r, .
Ar = Aˆr are the indices of the messages that eavesdropper r
wants to obtain.
Showing that the index code also satisfy a similar security
condition is not trivial, as the eavesdroppers in I can access the
messages themselves, instead of just functions of the messages
as in N. Note that these functions may not necessarily allow
one to recover the messages, as we allow non-zero error
decoding probability. So, it seems that the eavesdroppers in I
have “better” observations, which may lead to a larger leakage
in the code.
We will show that this is not the case. First, note the
following: (a) {XS, Z1} are mutually independent; (b) Xout(si ),
for each i ∈ S, are each a deterministic function of Xi; (c)
Bˆr ∩ Ar = ∅. With these, we have the following Markov
chain for every r:
XBˆr
− X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr } − (Z1, XAr , XS\(Ar∪Bˆr )), (10)
which is equivalent to
0 = I(XBˆr ; Z1, XAr , XS\(Ar∪Bˆr ) |X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }) (11a)
= I(XBˆr ; Z1, XAr , XS\(Ar∪Bˆr ), X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }
|X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }) (11b)
= I(XBˆr ; Z1, XS\Bˆr , X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }, X{si→1:i∈S}
|X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }) (11c)
= I(XBˆr ; Z1, XS\Bˆr , X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }, X{si→1:i∈S}, X1→2
|X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }) (11d)
≥ I(XBˆr ; XAr , X1→2 |X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }) (11e)
≥ I(XBˆr ; XAr |X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }, X1→2) (11f)
= I(XBˆr ; XAr |XBr ) ≥ 0. (11g)
This means that eavesdropper r, having observed the links
XBr , does not gain any more information about XAˆr even
if it can also observe the sources messages XBˆr . Now, we
show that the eavesdropper cannot do better if we replace its
observation of the outgoing links from the sources with the
source messages:
I(XBˆr , X1→2; XAr )
= I(XBˆr , X1→2, X{out(si ):i∈Bˆr }; XAr ) (12a)
= I(XBˆr , XBr ; XAr ) (12b)
= I(XBr ; XAr ) + I(XBˆr ; XAr |XBr ) (12c)
= I(XBr ; XAr ) (12d)
≤ η. (12e)
Since we set Xˆb = g1→2(XˆSˆ, Zˆ), we have (XˆSˆ, Zˆ, Xˆb)
d
=
(XS, Z1, X1→2). Also, by definition, Aˆr = Ar . So,
I(XˆBˆr , Xˆb; XˆAˆr ) ≤ η for I. This shows that the index code
(eˆ, Dˆ) is (Sˆ, (pXˆs : s ∈ Sˆ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible. 
VI. MAPPING FROM SECURE NETWORK CODING TO
SECURE INDEX CODING
A. Network-to-index coding mapping
In the other direction, consider a secure network-coding
instance N = (G,C,W). Let S = [S] and V = [V]. Without
7loss of generality, we assume that each message is requested
by at least one destination. Otherwise, it can be removed from
the system without affecting decodability and security.
To map N to an index-coding instance I = (Sˆ, Tˆ , {(Wˆt, Hˆt ) :
t ∈ Tˆ }, Wˆ), we perform the following steps:
• We first construct an augmented secure network-coding
instance N′ from any (possibly randomised) secure
network-coding instance N.†
• We then following the mapping by Effros et al. to obtain
Sˆ, Tˆ , {(Wˆt, Hˆt ) : t ∈ Tˆ } from N
′, except that we
omitting one receiver in Tˆ . We will show that omitting
this receiver will not affect the result.
• We will propose a mapping for the eavesdroppers to get
Wˆ .
For I, we set
nˆ =
∑
e∈E
⌊cen⌋ (13)
This means the number of bit that the sender can transmit in
I equals the total number of bits that can be transmitted on all
the edges in N.
Now, we describe the configuration mapping in detail:
1) Augmented secure network coding: We construct an
augmented secure network-coding instance N′ = (G′,C′,W ′)
as follows:
• G′ = (V ′, E ′) = (V, E) = G, and c′e = ce for all e ∈ E
′.
The vertices, the edges, and the edge capacities remain
the same.
• The connection requirement is augmented as follows:
S′ = S∪ {S+1, S+2, . . . , S+V}, where we introduce an
additional independent source X ′
S+v
originating at each
vertex v ∈ [V] that takes the role of and has the same
distribution as the random key Zv used in the randomised
encoding at vertex v in N. So, O′(S + v) = v and
D ′(S + v) = ∅, meaning that X ′
S+v
originates at vertex v,
and is not requested by any vertex. Also, for any vertex
v ∈ [V] that has no outgoing edge, there is no encoding
function associated with it, and we set X ′
S+v
= α. For
s ∈ S, O′(s) = O(s), and D ′(s) = D(s).
• W ′ = W , which means R ′ = R, B ′r = Br , and A
′
r =
Ar . The adversarial setting remains the same. Thus, the
random keys {X ′
S+v
: v ∈ [V]} are neither known to the
adversaries nor required to be protected.
By choosing X ′
S′
d
= (XS, ZV), any deterministic or ran-
domised secure network code for N is equivalent to a deter-
ministic secure network code for N′, where each node v is
assigned an additional source X ′
S+v
that is not required to be
decoded by any node. Note that for vertices v ∈ [V] that has
no outgoing edge, we set Zv = α.
Denote the set of vertices in N′ that are destinations
for some source messages by U ′ = { j ∈ V ′ : j ∈
D ′(i) for some i ∈ S′}. Note that O′(·) can map different
source indices to one vertex, and so O′−1( j) returns a set of
indices of messages originating at vertex j.
†We will see later that this step is required for the code mapping.
2) Network-to-index coding mapping: Now, we map N′ to
a secure index-coding instance I.
• Sˆ = S′ ∪ E ′. It consists of one message Xˆs for each
s ∈ S′ in N′, and one Xˆe for each e ∈ E
′ in N′.
• Tˆ = {tˆi}i∈U′ ∪ {tˆe}e∈E′ . This means I has |U
′ | + |E ′ |
receivers: one corresponds to each destination node in
N
′, and one corresponds to each edge in N′.
• For each tˆe ∈ Tˆ where e ∈ E
′, we set Hˆtˆe =
in(tail(e)) ∪O′−1(tail(e)), and Wˆtˆe = {e}.
• For each tˆi ∈ Tˆ where i ∈ U
′, we set Hˆtˆi = in(i) ∪
O′−1(i), and Wˆtˆi = {s ∈ [S] : i ∈ D
′(s)}.
• The eavesdropper setting W ′: Rˆ = R ′. For each rˆ ∈ Rˆ,
Bˆrˆ = B
′
rˆ
, and Aˆrˆ = A
′
rˆ
.
Figure 2 depicts an example of such a mapping.
Remark 2: This network-to-index coding mapping is
slightly different from that of Effros et al. [3] because we
do not require the use of an additional receiver tˆall in I.
Briefly, receiver tˆall has Hˆtˆall = XˆS′ and wants Wˆtˆall = XˆE′ .
This additional receiver was added to guarantee the following
useful property: For any broadcast message xˆb ∈ [2
nˆ] and
any realisation xˆS′ , if we know that all receivers can decode
their requested messages correctly, then there can be only one
unique realisation xˆE′ which has led to the broadcast message
xˆb. We will show that this required property remains true even
without receiver tˆall.
Part of the result for the network-to-index coding mapping
will be expressed in term of the total variation distance of
probability measures. Let p and q be two pmfs on an finite
discrete alphabet Ω. The total variation distance‡ between p
and q can be expressed in L1 norms as δ(p, q) = 1
2
‖p − q‖1 =
1
2
∑
σ∈Ω |p(σ) − q(σ)|. Also, denote the uniform distribution
on a finite set Ω by unif(Ω).
B. Equivalence results
With the above-mentioned conversion, we now state an
equivalence between N and I through N′:
Theorem 2: Let N be a secure network-coding instance,
N
′ be its augmented instance, and I be the corresponding
secure index-coding instance obtained using the network-to-
index coding mapping from N′. For any η ∈ R+
0
, ǫ ∈ [0, 0.5],
and n ∈ Z+, we have the following:
1) If N, in which all messages XS are independent and
uniformly distributed, is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-
feasible, then I is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible, where
XˆS
d
= XS .
2) If I, in which all messages XˆS′∪E′ are independent
and uniformly distributed, is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-
feasible, where Xˆe ∈ [2
⌊cen⌋ ] then
a) For ǫ = 0, N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible; and
b) Otherwise (for 0 < ǫ ≤ 0.5), N is (S, (pXs : s ∈
S), |R|η + ζ, γ, n)-feasible,
‡For two probability measures P and Q on a measurable space (X, Σ), the
total variation distance is defined as δ(P,Q)
def
= supA∈Σ |P(A) −Q(A) |.
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Fig. 2: A secure network-coding instance I , its augmented version N′, and the corresponding secure index-coding instance I,
where r1, r2, r
′
1
, r ′
2
, rˆ1, rˆ2 are eavesdroppers
where XS
d
= XˆS , ζ is a function of (ǫ, n), and γ is a function
of (ζ, ǫ, η, n), defined as follows:
γ
def
= min
{
(|R|η + ζ)
(
1
1 − ǫ
+
log e + nˆ
1 − (|R|η + ζ)
+ log |XS′ |
)
+
1
1 − ǫ
|R|Hb(ǫ) − log (1 − (|R|η + ζ)) , nˆ
}
,
ζ
def
= min
{
ǫ[1 + 2δ(pXˆb,unif([2
n]))], ǫ[1 + ǫ2nˆ], 1
}
.
Proof: See Sections VII and VIII.
Part 1 of the above theorem is proven by setting the pmfs
of the rest of the messages in I (which are Xˆ
Sˆ\S
) as follows:
As mentioned above, we choose X ′
S′
d
= (XS, ZV) for N
′ to
get an equivalent network-coding instance. For I, we choose
XˆS′
d
= X
′
S′
d
= (XS, ZV), and each Xˆe, e ∈ E
′, to be
uniformly distributed over [2 ⌊c
′
en⌋ ]. We will see that using
uniformly distributed Xˆe is the key to ensuring security. Note
that unlike the index-to-network mapping, here XˆE′ and X
′
E′
have different distributions. {Xˆi : i ∈ S
′∪E ′} in I are mutually
independent, while {X ′
i
: i ∈ E ′} in N′ are functions of X ′
S′
and may be correlated.§
In Part 2b of Theorem 2, the upper bounds on decoding error
and leakage increase exponentially with n. We can tighten the
bounds for linear codes:
Corollary 2.1: Let N be a secure network-coding instance
and I be the corresponding secure index-coding instance
obtained using the network-to-index coding mapping. For any
η ∈ R+
0
, ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5], and n ∈ Z+, we have the following: If I
is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible using a linear index code
with cardinality 2nˆ, where XˆS′∪E′ are independent and uni-
formly distributed, then N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), |R|η + ǫ, γ
′, n)-
feasible, where
γ′
def
= min
{
(|R|η + ǫ)
(
1
1 − ǫ
+
log e + nˆ
1 − (|R|η + ǫ)
+ log |XS′ |
)
+
1
1 − ǫ
|R|Hb(ǫ) − log (1 − (|R|η + ǫ)) , nˆ
}
.
Note here that, for linear codes, the error probability for N
is independent of n, and is solely a function of ǫ , η, and the
number of eavesdroppers |R|; the leakage for N is a linear
§This property is also true in the mapping of Effros et al.
function of n, and the coefficient of n can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing arbitrarily small η and ǫ . This means
a sequence of strongly-secure index codes for I translates
to a sequence of weakly-secure network codes for N (with
appropriate rate scaling).
Proof of Corollary 2.1: Using linear codes for I,
if the messages are uniformly distributed, then the code-
word Xˆb is uniformly distributed over its support. So,
δ(pXˆb,unif([2
n])) = 0, which implies ζ = ǫ , and Corol-
lary 2.1 follows directly from Part 2b of Theorem 2.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 – PART 1 (THE FORWARD
DIRECTION)
We will now prove Part 1 in Theorem 2, that is N is
(S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n-feasible ⇒ I is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈
S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible.
A. Code construction
First, note that N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible for
pXS if and only if N
′ is (S, (pX′s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)–feasible with
X
′
S′
d
= (XS, ZV) for some ZV using deterministic network
encoding functions {e′e} derived from {ee} for N, where all
the randomness {Zv : v ∈ V} in the network code for N is
realised using {X ′
S+v
: v ∈ V} in N′.
Since the network code for N′ is deterministic, we use the
same code mapping as that proposed by Effros et al. [3]: The
sender broadcasts Xˆb = [Xˆb,e : e ∈ E
′], where
Xˆb,e = Xˆe + g
′
e(XˆS′) mod 2
⌊cen⌋ . (14)
Note that each Xˆe, g
′
e ∈ [2
⌊c′en⌋ ] = [2 ⌊cen⌋ ], and therefore
Xˆb ∈ [
∏
e∈E′ 2
⌊cen⌋ ] = [2
∑
e∈E′ ⌊cen⌋ ] = [2nˆ].
B. Decoding criteria
In N, according to definition (1), with probability of at least
(1 − ǫ) (over the messages pXS ), every vertex v ∈ U
′ can
decode all messages that it requires from the message on all
incoming edges and messages originating at v. Since, only
messages XS of all messages XS′ in N
′ need to be decoded,
9it follows that, in N′, with probability of at least (1− ǫ), every
v ∈ U ′ satisfies the following:
Pr
{
X
′
{s∈S′:v∈D′(s)}
= X
′
{s∈[S]:v∈D′(s)}
= d′v(X
′
in(v)∪O′−1(v)
)
}
≥ 1 − ǫ, (15)
or equivalently,
Pr
{
X
′
{s∈S′:v∈D′(s)}
= X
′
{s∈[S]:v∈D′(s)}
= d′v([g
′
e(X
′
S′
)]e∈in(v)), X
′
O′−1(v)
)
}
≥ 1 − ǫ. (16)
We first consider receivers tˆi ∈ Tˆ where i ∈ U
′: As
mentioned above, while source messages X ′
O′−1(v)
in N′ and
XˆO′−1(v) in I have the same distribution, edge messages X
′
in(v)
in N′ and Xˆin(v) I may not. So, though a node iˆi ∈ Tˆ
in I has side information (Xˆin(i), Xˆ
′
O′−1(i)
), directly porting
(15) to I will not work, as the pmf (X ′
S′
, X ′
E′
) and that of
(XˆS′, XˆE′) = XˆSˆ are different. To deal with this issue, consider
the broadcast message Xˆb. From (14), any receiver that knows
Xˆe can obtain g
′
e(XˆS′) from the broadcast message Xˆb, where
(X ′
S′
, [g′e(X
′
S′
)]e∈E′) and (XˆS′, [g
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈E′) have the same
distribution.
In I, as Hˆtˆi = in(i) ∪ O
′−1(i) by the mapping, receiver tˆi
knows XˆO′−1(i) and can obtain [g
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈in(i)) from Xˆb and
Xˆin(i) using (14). So, using (16) with a change of variables
(from non-hatted to hatted), receiver tˆi ∈ Tˆ can decode the
messages it requires correctly with probability of at least (1−ǫ)
because
Pr
{
XˆWˆtˆi
= Xˆ{s∈[S]:i∈D′(s)} = d
′
i([g
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈in(i)), XˆO′−1(i))
}
≥ 1 − ǫ,
because (X ′
S′
, [g′e(X
′
S′
)]e∈E′)
d
= (XˆS′, [g
′
e(XˆS′)]e∈E′).
Now, we consider receivers tˆe ∈ Tˆ where e ∈ E
′. Recall
that Hˆtˆe = in(tail(e)) ∪ O
′−1(tail(e)), and Wˆtˆe = {e}.
Receiver tˆe performs the following steps:
(i) As it knows {Xˆd : d ∈ in(tail(e))}, it can obtain
{g′
d
(XˆS′) : d ∈ in(tail(e))} from (14).
(ii) Since it also knows XˆO′−1(tail(e)) as side information, it
then calculates
e′e([g
′
d
(XˆS′) : d ∈ in(tail(e))], XˆO′−1(tail(e))), which
equals g′e(XˆS′), where e
′
e is the local encoding function
of edge e in N′.
(iii) With g′e(XˆS′) and the broadcast message Xˆb,e, it obtains
the required Xˆe using (14).
So, receiver tˆe for each e ∈ E
′ must be able to correctly decode
the required Xˆe without error.
Combining these two classes of receivers, we have shown
that all receivers in I can correctly decode their required
messages with probability of at least (1 − ǫ).
C. Security criteria
Given I(XAr ; XBr ) ≤ η for N
′, we need to show
I(XˆAˆr ; Xˆb, XˆBˆr ) ≤ η for I.
We now consider the security constraints. For each rˆ ∈ Rˆ,
H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ )
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb,e : e ∈ E
′}, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ }) (17a)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb,e : e ∈ Bˆrˆ }, {Xˆe
′ : e′ ∈ Bˆrˆ }) (17b)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆb,e, Xˆe, g
′
e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ }) (17c)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{Xˆe, g
′
e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ }) (17d)
= H(XˆAˆrˆ |{g
′
e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ }) (17e)
= H(XˆA′
rˆ
|{g′e(XˆS′) : e ∈ B
′
rˆ }) (17f)
= H(X ′A′
rˆ
|{g′e(X
′
S′
) : e ∈ B ′rˆ }) (17g)
= H(X ′A′
rˆ
|X ′B′
rˆ
) = H(XArˆ |XBrˆ ), (17h)
where (17b) follows from the Markov chain
XˆAˆrˆ
−
(
{Xˆb,e : e ∈ Bˆrˆ }, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ }
)
− ({Xˆb,e : e < Bˆrˆ }),
where {Xˆb(e) : e < Bˆrˆ } are independent of (XˆAˆrˆ , {Xˆb,e : e ∈
Bˆrˆ }, {Xˆe′ : e
′ ∈ Bˆrˆ }), because the former has been randomised
by independently and uniformly distributed {Xˆe : e < Bˆrˆ }
(which are independent of (XˆAˆrˆ , XˆBˆrˆ , XˆS′), see (14));
(17c) follows from (14);
(17d) is derived because Xˆb,e is a deterministic function of
(Xˆe, g
′
e(XˆS′));
(17e) follows from the Markov chain
XˆAˆrˆ
− {g′e(XˆS′) : e ∈ Bˆrˆ } − {Xˆe : e ∈ Bˆrˆ },
which can be derived from noting that {Xˆe : e ∈ E
′} are
independent of (XˆAˆrˆ , XˆS′);
(17g) follows from a change of variables (from hatted to non-
hatted);
(17h) is obtained from noting that {g′e(X
′
S′
) : e ∈ B ′
rˆ
} = X ′
B′
rˆ
Now, for N, if I(XAr ; XBr ) ≤ η, then
I(XˆAˆr ; Xˆb, XˆBˆr ) = H(XˆAˆr ) − H(XˆAˆrˆ |Xˆb, XˆBˆrˆ ) (18a)
= H(XˆAˆr ) − H(XArˆ |XBrˆ ) (18b)
= H(XAr ) − H(XArˆ |XBrˆ ) (18c)
= I(XAr ; XBr ) < η, (18d)
where (18b) follows from (17h), and (18c) follows from XS
d
=
XˆS . So, the index code is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible.
VIII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 – PART 2 (THE BACKWARD
DIRECTION)
We will now prove Proof of Part 2 in Theorem 2, that is,
when I is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible.
Recall that XˆS′∪E′ are independent and uniformly dis-
tributed. We will again use the network-code construction
proposed by Effros et al. [3].
A. Code construction
We first show some preliminary results required for decod-
ability. Define the following:
Definition 1: Consider I. For any realisation xˆS′ , let YxˆS′
denote the set of realisations xˆE′ such that if the message tuple
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(xˆS′, xˆE′) for any xˆE′ ∈ YxˆS′ , then all receivers can decode
their required messages correctly.
This means for any (xˆS′, xˆE′) such that xˆE′ ∈ YxˆS′ , we have
dˆtˆi (xˆb, xˆHˆtˆi
) = dˆtˆi (xˆb, xˆin(i)∪O′−1(i)) (19a)
= xˆWˆtˆi
= xˆ {s∈[S]:i∈D′(s)}, (19b)
for receiver tˆi , for each i ∈ U
′,
dˆtˆe (xˆb, xˆHˆtˆe
) = dˆtˆe (xˆb, xˆin(tail(e))∪O′−1(tail(e))) (20a)
= xˆWˆtˆe
= xˆe ∈ [2
⌊c′en⌋ ]. (20b)
and receiver tˆe, for each e ∈ E
′,
In the secure index-coding instance I, messages XˆE′ are
independent of messages XˆS′ , and the broadcast message Xˆb
is a function of these messages eˆ(Xˆ
Sˆ
), which is computed by
the sender.
We would like to use the decoding functions (19a) and (20a)
for the network-coding equivalence N′. But, in N′, there is no
centralised node to calculate Xˆb. To deal with this problem, it
is proposed [3] that the value of xˆb in these functions be fixed
to some constant σ ∈ [2nˆ]. In other words, in contrast to I
where Xˆb varies with XˆS′ , we fix this value for N
′. Then, we
set the local encoding function of each edge e ∈ E ′ to be
ee(x
′
in(tail(e))
, x ′
O′−1(tail(e))
) = dˆtˆe (σ, x
′
in(tail(e))
x
′
O′−1(tail(e))
)
∈ [2 ⌊c
′
en⌋ ], (21)
and the decoding function of each destination node i ∈ U ′ to
be
di(x
′
in(i)
, x ′
O′−1(i)
) = dˆtˆi (σ, x
′
in(i)
, x ′
O′−1(i)
). (22)
The idea is that for each edge e ∈ E ′ in N′, its tail node
tail(e) can generate the correct outgoing edge messages x′e
from the incoming messages x ′
in(tail(e))
, the source messages
x
′
O′−1(tail(e))
originating from the node, and the chosen σ via
(20a) (or equivalently, (21)), and consequently, all destination
nodes can recover their required messages via (19a) (or
equivalently, (22)). For a chosen σ, define a function φσ(·)
to be the collection of global edge encoding functions (21),
that is, φσ(x
′
S′
)
def
= (ge : e ∈ E
′) = x ′
E′
.
The challenge here is to select a suitable σ for N′. A suitable
σ exists to guarantee decodability [3]. In this paper, we need
to further show that a suitable σ exists to guarantee both
decodability and security.
B. Some decodability properties
We start with the following proposition:
Proposition 1: For any choice of σ ∈ [2nˆ] and any
realisation of xˆS′, there is at most one xˆE′ ∈ YxˆS′ for which
eˆ(xˆ
Sˆ
) = eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ.
Effros et al. [3, Claim 1] have proven this for a slightly
different network-to-index instance mapping, where there is
an additional receiver for the index-coding equivalence called
tˆall that has XˆS′ and wants XˆE′ . Their proof relies mainly
on the existence of the additional receiver. We will prove
Proposition 1 without this additional receiver.
Proof of Proposition 1: Pick any realisation xˆS′ of XˆS′ .
Suppose to the contradiction that there exists two distinct
realisations xˆE′ and xˆ
′
E′
of XˆE′ such that (i) eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) =
eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ, and (ii) xˆE′, xˆ
′
E′
∈ YxˆS′ . Now, as I is
constructed from an acyclic network-coding instance N′, it
follows that given a deterministic index code (eˆ, Dˆ) (where
Dˆ = {dˆt : t ∈ Tˆ })), the messages xˆS′, and the broadcast
message σ, we can completely determine the messages xˆE′.
To see this, start from a vertex i with in-degree zero in N′,
all receivers tˆe in I where e ∈ out(i) must decode xˆe solely
from xˆO′−1(i) and σ. By starting from all vertices with zero in-
degree (also known as root or source vertices) and traversing
the edges e ∈ E ′ in the graph of N′, we can identify all
corresponding receiver tˆe in I, who must decode xˆe solely
from the broadcast message σ, part of { xˆi : i ∈ S
′}, and part
of { xˆe : e ∈ E
′} that we have obtained from previous steps.
Now, since the messages xˆE′ is a deterministic function of
(Dˆ, xˆS′, σ), some receiver tˆe, e ∈ E
′ must decode its required
message xˆe wrongly in either one of the two realisations of
XˆE′ , namely, xˆE′ and xˆ
′
E′
. This contradictions the definition
of YxˆS′ .
Next, we state a proposition due to Effros et al.
Proposition 2: ([3, Claim 2]) If each Xˆi, i ∈ S
′, is uniformly
distributed, then there exists a σ ∈ [2nˆ] such that at least (1−ǫ)
of the source realisations xˆS′ of XˆS′ satisfy eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ
for some xˆE′ ∈ YxˆS′ .
Note that due our use of a slightly different mapping (13),
the above lemma does not require the assumption that all
{2cen : e ∈ E ′} being integers, an assumption that resulted
in some slight mismatch in rates [3, p. 2484].
C. Some security properties
Since I is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, nˆ)-feasible, we have
η ≥ I(XˆAˆr ; Xˆb, XˆBˆr ) (23a)
≥ I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb) (23b)
=
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb = σ). (23c)
It turns out that there may not exist a suitable σ that gives
both matching error and leakage criteria in N’ in general.
Nonetheless, we are able to prove its existence when ǫ = 0
(i.e., perfect decodability). Otherwise when ǫ > 0, we prove
a weaker form of equivalence where the error probability and
the leakage of N′ do not exactly match those for I.
D. Proof of Part 2a in Theorem 2: ǫ = 0
1) Decoding criteria: Under this condition, for any mes-
sage realisation (xˆS′, xˆE′), all receivers in I can decode their
required messages correctly. From the definition of YxˆS′ , we
have that YxˆS′ =
∏
e=E′[2
⌊c′en⌋ ] = XE′ is the set of all
realisations of xˆE′, for any xˆS′. Due to the normalisation of
the edge capacities, |YxˆS′ | = |
∏
e=E′[2
⌊c′en⌋ ]| = 2nˆ. From
Proposition 1, we know that if we pick any xˆS′ , there is a
bijective map between xˆE′ and xˆb.
Now, we select any σ ∈ [2nˆ]. For every xˆS′, we can find
exactly one xˆE′ ∈ YxˆS′ = XS′ for which eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ. So,
for N′, by selecting any σ ∈ [2nˆ] in (21) and (22), decoding
in N′ will succeed, giving Pe = 0.
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2) Security criteria: Since (XˆS′, XˆE′) are independent and
uniformly distributed, p
XˆS′,XˆE′
(xˆS′, xˆE′) = 1/(|XS′ | |XE′ |) and
p
XˆS′
(xˆS′) = 1/|XS′ |, for all xˆS′ and xˆE′. As there is a bijective
map between xˆE′ and xˆb given any xˆS′ , we have the following
for every xˆS′ and xˆb:
pXˆb |XˆS′,
(xˆb | xˆS′) = pXˆE′ |XˆS′,(xˆE
′ | xˆS′) (24a)
=
p
XˆS′,XˆE′
(xˆS′, xˆE′)
p
XˆS′
(xˆS′)
=
1
|XE′ |
, (24b)
and
pXˆb (xˆb) =
∑
xˆS′, xˆE′
p
XˆS′,XˆE′
(xˆS′, xˆE′)1(eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ) (25a)
=
1
|XS′ | |XE′ |
∑ˆ
xS′
1 =
1
|XE′ |
, (25b)
where 1(E) is the indicator function, which returns 1 is E is
true, and 0 otherwise, and (25b) is obtained as there is exactly
one xˆE′ for which eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ.
So,
p
XˆS′ |Xˆb
(xˆS′ | xˆb) =
p
XˆS′
(xˆS′)pXˆb |XˆS′ (xˆb | xˆS
′)
pXˆb (xˆb)
(26a)
=
1
|XS′ |
, (26b)
for all xˆS′ and xˆb.
For N′, by choosing any σ in (21) and (22)), we have X ′
E′
=
φσ(X
′
S′
), and thus giving
pX′
E′
|X′
S′
(b |a) = p
XˆE′ |XˆS′ Xˆb
(b |a, σ), (27)
and thus
pX′
E′
,X′
S′
(b, a) = pX′
E′
|X′
S′
(b |a)pX′
S′
(a) (28a)
= pX′
E′
|X′
S′
(b |a)
1
|XS′ |
(28b)
= p
XˆE′ |XˆS′ Xˆb
(b |a, σ)p
XˆS′ |Xˆb
(a |σ) (28c)
= p
XˆE′,XˆS′ |Xˆb
(b, a |σ), (28d)
where (28c) follows from (26b).
From (23c), since the weighted average of I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb =
σ) over all σ ∈ [2nˆ] is not greater than η, there exists one
σ′ ∈ [2nˆ] for which I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb = σ
′) ≤ η. This means,
using this chosen σ′ for N′ and N,
I(XAr ; XBr ) = I(X
′
A′r
; X ′B′r
)
(a)
= I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb = σ
′) ≤ η,
(29)
where (a) follows from (28d).
So, if ǫ = 0, then that I is (S, (pXˆs : s ∈ S), 0, η, nˆ)-feasible
implies that N is (S, (pXs : s ∈ S), 0, η, n)-feasible.
E. Proof of Part 2b in Theorem 2: ǫ > 0
Issues:
Unfortunately, the results for the perfect-decoding case does
not extend straightforwardly to the case of imperfect decoding
due to the following reasons:
1) When ǫ = 0, choosing any σ for N′ guarantees perfect
decoding for N′, and we only need to select a good σ to
guarantee the security criterion. However, when ǫ > 0, we
need to choose a good σ that simultaneously guarantees
the decodability and the security criteria.
2) When ǫ > 0, the random variables in the two instances
I and N′ do not necessarily have the same distribution
as in (28d). This is because if some message realisation
results in decoding error, then |YxˆS′ | < 2
nˆ for some xˆS′.
This means for this xˆS′ , there could be multiple distinct
xˆ
(1)
E′
, xˆ
(2)
E′
∈ XS′ , xˆ
(1)
E′
, xˆ
(2)
E′
, for which eˆ(xˆS′, xˆ
(1)
E′
) =
eˆ(xˆS′, xˆ
(2)
E′
). This leads to the following:
a) As there may not be a bijective map between xˆE′ and
xˆb for this xˆS′, (24a) may not be true.
b) (25b) may not hold.
c) (27) may not hold.
As a results, we cannot guarantee (29.a).
Our proposed solution:
We will resolve the above issues through the following
steps:
S.1 Relate security expressions for N′ to that for I.
S.2 Express security in I in terms of expressions obtained in
S.1 averaged over Xˆb.
S.3 Relate the decoding criterion in N′ to that in I.
S.4 Express decodability in I as an average over Xˆb using
S.3.
S.5 Combine the results from steps S.2 and S.4 to find a
σ = xˆb that is simultaneously good for security and
decodability.
We now present the steps in detail:
1) S.1: Relate security expressions for N′ to that for I:
Note that the edge messages X ′
E′
in N′ are generated by
choosing a specific σ for the network code (21)–(22), which
are the decoding function in I. So, if decoding in I is correct
and xˆb = eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ, then choosing σ for N
′, we have
x
′
E′
= φσ(x
′
S′
) for (x ′
S′
, x ′
E′
) = (xˆS′, xˆE′).
For this reason, we define the following for I:
Dˆ =
{
1, if decoding of all receivers in I is correct,
0, otherwise.
(30)
This means
pX′
E′
|X′
S′
(b |a) = p
XˆE′ |XˆS′,Dˆ,Xˆb
(b |a,1, σ),
for all a where p
XˆS′,Dˆ,Xˆb
(a, 1, σ) > 0, (31)
which is similar to (27) for the perfect-decoding case.
Now, in order to restrict the leakage I(X ′
A′r
; X ′
B′r
) in N′,
we will relate I(X ′
A′r
; X ′
B′r
) to I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ),
similar to (29.a) for the perfect-decoding case.
To this end, we define the following:
Definition 2:
Gσ
def
= { xˆS′ ∈ XS′ : dˆ = 1 and xˆb = σ}.
Gσ is the set of all message realisations xˆS′ that result in
both (i) correct decoding in I (meaning that dˆ = 1) and (ii)
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the broadcast message xˆb = eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ, for some xˆE′.
Also define
(1 − ǫ ′)
def
=
|Gσ |
|XS′ |
(32)
Gcσ
def
= XS′ \ Gσ . (33)
We will bound ǫ ′ later.
Step 1 is complete with the following lemma:
Lemma 1: For any σ ∈ [2nˆ],
I(X ′A′r
; X ′B′r
) ≤ I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ ǫ ′ log |XS′ | − log(1 − ǫ
′) +
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(log e + nˆ)).
(34)
Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Ap-
pendix A
2) S.2: Express security in I in terms of expressions ob-
tained in S.1 averaged over Xˆb: In this step, we will relate
I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ) (in Lemma 1) to I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb)
(which is the leakage in I) and then to the security criteria η
in I.
From the identity
I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb) + I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ | XˆBˆr , Xˆb)
= I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ|Xˆb) + I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ, Xˆb), (35)
we get
I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Xˆb)
= I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ|Xˆb) − I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ| XˆBˆr , Xˆb) + I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ, Xˆb)
(36a)
= I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ|Xˆb) − I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ| XˆBˆr , Xˆb)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb). (36b)
Substituting (36b) into (23c), we have∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
[
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ |Xˆb = σ) − I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ| XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
]
≤ η,
(37)
for each eavesdropper r ∈ R. Summing it for all eavesdroppers
and swapping the summation order, we get
|R|η ≥
∑
r ∈R
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
[
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ |Xˆb = σ)
− I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ | XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
]
(38a)
=
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb (σ)
∑
r ∈R
[
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ|Xˆb = σ)
− I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ | XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
]
. (38b)
We will use this and Lemma 1 to bound the leakage in
N
′ in step S.5. As we need to consider both decoding and
security simultaneously, we will now consider the probability
of decoding error.
3) S.3: Relate the decoding criterion in N′ to that in I:
We first define some terminology:
In I, we say that a realisation (XˆS′, XˆE′) is I-good if and
only if each receiver in I can decode its required messages
correctly. By definition, there are at least (1 − ǫ)|XS′ | |XE′ | =
(1 − ǫ)|XS′ |2
nˆ good realisations. We say that a message
realisation is I-bad if and only if it is not I-good.
Now, consider N′ using the network code defined in (21)
and (22). We say that a realisation of messages X ′
S′
is N′-good
if and only if every receiver in N′ can decode its required
messages correctly. By code construction, if (xˆS′, xˆE′) is I-
good for I, then x ′
S′
= xˆS′ is N
′-good for N′ using σ =
eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) for the network code.
For a specific σ ∈ [2nˆ], the set of I-good realisations are
defined as follows:
Definition 3:
Zσ
def
= {(xˆS′, xˆE′) ∈ XS′ × XE′ :eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ and (39)
(xˆS′, xˆE′) is I-good}. (40)
Summing over all σ ∈ [2nˆ], the total number of I-good
realisations in I is
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ] |Zσ | ≥ (1−ǫ)|XS′ |2
nˆ, and the total
number of I-bad realisations must be 2nˆ |XS′ |−
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ] |Zσ | ≤
ǫ |XS′ |2
nˆ.
Next, note that for any chosen σ ∈ [2nˆ], invoking Proposi-
tion 1, we have |Gσ | = |Zσ |. So,
ǫ ≥ 1 −
1
2nˆ
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
|Gσ |
|XS′ |
(41a)
=
1
2nˆ
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
(
|XS′ | − |Gσ |
|XS′ |
)
(41b)
=
1
2nˆ
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
(41c)
=
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
unif([2nˆ])
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
. (41d)
Also, note that by choosing σ for the network code, at
least |Gσ | realisations of X
′
S′
in N′ that are N′-good. Since
the messages are X ′
S′
uniformly generated, the probability of
decoding error in N′ when σ is chosen is
Pe,σ ≤
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
. (42)
4) S.4: Express decodability in I as an average over Xˆb
using S.3.: For decodability, we would choose a σ that is has
a low
|Gc
σ
|
|XS′ |
, which we can then use to upper bound Pe,σ . The
difficulty in choosing a suitable σ is caused by the different
ways in which the leakage and the error probability in I are
related to σ. See (38b) where η is related to pXˆb(σ), and (41d)
where ǫ is related to the uniform distribution.
To circumvent this, we will now consider three ways of
relating pXˆb to ǫ:
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(i) Recall that the total variation distance between pXˆb
and unif([2nˆ]) is defined as δ(pXˆb, unif([2
nˆ])) =
1
2
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ] |pXˆb(σ) − 2
−nˆ |. Also, note that 0 ≤
|Gc
σ′
|
|XS′ |
≤ 1
for all σ′ ∈ [2nˆ] by definition. This means
1
2
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
[
|pXˆb(σ) − 2
−nˆ |
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
]
≤ δ(pXˆb, unif([2
nˆ])),
(43)
which implies∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
[
(pXˆb(σ) − 2
−nˆ)
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
]
≤ 2δ(pXˆb,unif([2
nˆ])),
(44)
and this gives∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
≤
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
2−nˆ
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
+ 2δ(pXˆb,unif([2
nˆ])) (45a)
≤ ǫ + 2δ(pXˆb,unif([2
nˆ])), (45b)
where (45b) follows from (41c).
(ii) Recall again that in I, for a specific σ ∈ [2nˆ], there
are |Zσ | I-good source realisations that gives xˆb = σ.
And, there at most ǫ |XS′ |2
nˆ
I-bad realisations, there are
at most |Zσ | + ǫ |XS′ |2
nˆ realisations that lead to xˆb = σ.
By definition,
pXˆb(σ) =
∑
xˆS′, xˆE′
p
XˆS′,XˆE′,Xˆb
(xˆS′, xˆE′, σ) (46a)
=
∑
xˆS′, xˆE′
p
XˆS′,XˆE′
(xˆS′, xˆE′)1(eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ)
(46b)
=
1
|XS′ |2nˆ
∑
xˆS′, xˆE′
1(eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ) (46c)
=
the number of realisations that give xˆb = σ
|XS′ |2nˆ
(46d)
≤
|Zσ | + ǫ |XS′ |2
nˆ
|XS′ |2nˆ
(46e)
≤
|XS′ | + ǫ |XS′ |2
nˆ
|XS′ |2nˆ
(46f)
=
1
2nˆ
+ ǫ, (46g)
Now,∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
≤
1
2nˆ
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
+ ǫ
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
(47a)
≤ ǫ + ǫ(ǫ2nˆ) (47b)
= ǫ(1 + ǫ2nˆ), (47c)
where (47b) follows from (41c).
(iii) Also, since
|Gc
σ
|
|XS′ |
≤ 1 for all σ, we have∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
≤ 1. (48)
From (45b), (47c), and (48), we have∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
≤ min
{
ǫ[1 + 2δ(pXˆb,unif([2
n]))],
ǫ[1 + ǫ2nˆ], 1
}
def
= ζ . (49a)
5) S.5: Combing the results from steps S.2 and S.4 to
find a σ = xˆb that is simultaneously good for security and
decodability in I: Combining (49a) and (38b), we get
|R|η + ζ ≥
∑
σ∈[2nˆ ]
pXˆb(σ)
(
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
+
∑
r ∈R
[
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ |Xˆb = σ)
− I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ| XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
])
. (50)
So, there exists at least one σ ∈ [2nˆ] such that
|R|η + ζ ≥
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
+
∑
r ∈R
[
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ |Xˆb = σ)
− I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ | XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
+ pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
]
, (51)
from which we have the probability of decoding error in N′
being bounded from above as
Pe,σ ≤
|Gcσ |
|XS′ |
≤ |R|η + ζ, (52)
and the following security constraint for I:∑
r ∈R
pDˆ(1)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
≤ |R|η + ζ +
∑
r ∈R
[
− I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ |Xˆb = σ)
+ I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ | XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
− pDˆ(0)I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 0, Xˆb = σ)
]
, (53)
which implies that for every eavesdropper r ′ ∈ R,
I(XˆAˆr′
; XˆBˆr′
|Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
≤
1
pDˆ(1)
[
|R|η + ζ +
∑
r ∈R
I(XˆAˆr ; Dˆ| XˆBˆr , Xˆb = σ)
]
(54)
≤
1
1 − ǫ
[|R|(η + H(Dˆ)) + ζ]. (55)
Note that pDˆ(1) ≥ 1 − ǫ , and we have assumed that 0 < ǫ ≤
0.5.
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Lastly, recall by definition that ǫ ′
def
=
|Gc
σ
|
|XS′ |
≤ |R|η+ ζ for the
chosen σ. By substituting Lemma 1 into (55), we have the
following security constraint for N′:
I(X ′A′
r′
; X ′B′
r′
)
≤
1
1 − ǫ
[|R|(η + Hb(ǫ)) + ζ]
+ (|R|η + ζ) log |XS′ | − log(1 − (|R|η + ζ))
+
(|R|η + ζ)
1 − (|R|η + ζ)
(log e + nˆ)) (56a)
= (|R|η + ζ)
(
1
1 − ǫ
+
log e + nˆ
1 − (|R|η + ζ)
+ log |XS′ |
)
+
1
1 − ǫ
|R|Hb(ǫ) − log (1 − (|R|η + ζ)) , (56b)
for each r ′ ∈ R in N′.
Finally, note that I(X ′
A′
r′
; X ′
B′
r′
) ≤ (X ′
B′
r′
) ≤ H(X ′
E′
) ≤ nˆ. 
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Lemma 1 follows directly from the following two proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3: For any σ ∈ [2nˆ],
H(X ′B′r ) − H(XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
≤ ǫ ′ log |XS′ | − log(1 − ǫ
′). (57)
Proposition 4: For any σ ∈ [2nˆ],
H(XˆBˆr | XˆAˆr , Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ) − H(X
′
B′r
|X ′A′r )
≤
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(log e + nˆ)). (58)
With the above proposition we have Lemma 1, as follows:
I(X ′A′r
; X ′B′r
) − I(XˆAˆr ; XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
= H(X ′B′r
) − H(X ′B′r
|X ′A′r
) − [H(XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
− H(XˆBˆr | XˆAˆr , Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)]
≤ ǫ ′ log |XS′ | − log(1 − ǫ
′) +
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(log e + nˆ)). 
In the following, we omit the subscript of probability mass
functions. The reader can easily infer the subscript from the
argument.
A. Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that the messages (XˆS′, XˆE′) for I and X
′
S′
for N′ are
both uniformly distributed. From Proposition 1, if decoding is
successful, that is, dˆ = 1, we know that for each xˆS′ ∈ Gσ ,
there is only one unique xˆE′ for which eˆ(xˆS′, xˆE′) = σ. This
implies
p(xˆS′ |1, σ) =

1
|Gσ |
, if xˆS′ ∈ Gσ,
0, otherwise;
(60)
and
p(x ′
S′
) =
1
|XS′ |
, for all x ′
S′
∈ XS′ . (61)
Note that when decoding is correct, xˆE′ = φσ(xˆS′) is a
deterministic function of xˆS′ and σ. So,
p(xˆ Bˆr |1, σ) =
∑ˆ
xS′
p(xˆS′, xˆ Bˆr |1, σ) (62a)
=
∑
xˆS′
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ)p(xˆS′ |1, σ) (62b)
=
∑ˆ
xS′
1([φσ(xˆS′)]Bˆr = xˆ Bˆr )p(xˆS′ |1, σ) (62c)
=
∑
xˆS′ ∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
p(xˆS′ |1, σ), (62d)
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where we have used the notation [aA]B
def
= aB to denote a
sub-vector, for some B ⊆ A. Similarly,
p(x ′B′r
) =
∑
x′
S′
p(x ′
S′
, x ′B′r
) (63a)
=
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
p(x ′
S′
) (63b)
=
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
. (63c)
Now, using (62d),
H(XˆBˆr |Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
= −
∑
xˆBˆr
p(xˆ Bˆr |1, σ) log p(xˆ Bˆr |1, σ) (64a)
= −
∑ˆ
xBˆr
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
p(xˆS′ |1, σ)
ª®®®®¬
log
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
p(xˆS′ |1, σ)
ª®®®®¬
(64b)
= −
∑ˆ
xBˆr
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
|Gσ |
ª®®®®¬
log
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
|Gσ |
ª®®®®¬
(64c)
= −
∑ˆ
xBˆr
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
ª®®®®¬
log
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
ª®®®®¬
(64d)
= −
1
1 − ǫ ′
∑
xˆBˆr
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
|XS′ |
ª®®®®¬
log
©­­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
|XS′ |
ª®®®®¬
+ log(1 − ǫ ′) (64e)
where (64e) follows from
1
1 − ǫ ′
∑
xˆBˆr
∑
xˆS′ ∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (xˆS′ )]Bˆr =xˆBˆr
1
|XS′ |
=
∑ˆ
xBˆr
p(xˆ Bˆr |1, σ) = 1.
Next, using (63c),
H(X ′B′r
)
= −
∑
x′
B′r
p(x ′B′r
) log p(x ′B′r
) (65a)
= −
∑
x′
B′r
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
log p(x ′B′r
) (65b)
= −
∑
x′
B′r
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
log
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
−
∑
x′
B′r
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′\Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
log
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
(65c)
≤ −
∑
x′
B′r
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
log
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
−
1
|X′
S′
|
©­­­­­«
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′\Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
log
(
1
|XS′ |
)ª®®®®®¬
(65d)
≤ −
1
1 − ǫ ′
∑
x′
B′r
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
log
©­­­­­«
∑
x
′
S′
∈Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1
|X′
S′
|
ª®®®®®¬
+ ǫ ′ log |XS′ | (65e)
where (65e) follows from
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈XS′\Gσ
s.t. [φσ (x
′
S′
)]B′r
=x
′
B′r
1 = |Gcσ | =
ǫ ′ |XS′ |.
Combining (64e) and (65e), we have Proposition 3. 
B. Proof of Proposition 4
Define the following:
WxˆAˆr
def
= { xˆS′ ∈ XS′ : [xˆS′]Aˆr = xˆAˆr }, (66)
WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
def
=WxˆAˆr ∩ Gσ, (67)
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WB
xˆAˆr
,σ
def
=WxˆAˆr \W
G
xˆAˆr
,σ =WxˆAˆr ∩ G
c
σ . (68)
It follows that
|WxˆAˆr | = |XS′\Aˆr | =
|XS′ |
|XAˆr |
, (69)
|WB
xˆAˆr
,σ | ≤ |XS′ \ Gσ | = ǫ
′ |XS′ | = |G
c
σ |, (70)
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ | ≥
(
1
|XAˆr |
− ǫ ′
)
|XS′ |. (71)
Using Bayes’s rule, ∑
c
p(a, b, c) = p(a, b), (72a)∑
c
p(a, c)p(b|a, c) = p(a)p(b|a), (72b)
1
p(a)
∑
c
p(a, c)p(b|a, c) = p(b|a). (72c)
Now,
p(xˆAˆr |1, σ) =
∑
xˆS′ ∈XS′
p(xˆS′, xˆAˆr |1, σ) (73a)
=
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆS′, xˆAˆr |1, σ) (73b)
=
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆS′ |1, σ) (73c)
=
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
1
|Gσ |
(73d)
=
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
|Gσ |
. (73e)
Here,
(73b) is derived because given that dˆ = 1 and xˆb = σ, we
must have xˆS′ ∈ Gσ , and if xˆAˆr = a, then xˆS′ ∈ Wa;
(73c) follows from p(xˆAˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ) = 1 if xˆS′ ∈ W
G
xˆAˆr
,σ
;
(73d) follows from (60).
Also,
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆAˆr , 1, σ)
=
1
p(xˆAˆr |1, σ)
∑
xˆS′ ∈XS′
p(xˆS′, xˆAˆr |1, σ)p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, xˆAˆr , 1, σ)
(74a)
=
|Gσ |
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
1
|Gσ |
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS
′, xˆAˆr , 1, σ) (74b)
=
1
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ), (74c)
where (74b) follows the same arguments as (73b)–(73d).
With this, we now calculate
H(XˆBˆr | XˆAˆr , Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ)
= −
∑ˆ
xAˆr
:
s.t. ∃xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
∑ˆ
xBˆr
p(xˆAˆr |1, σ)p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆAˆr , 1, σ)
log p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆAˆr , 1, σ) (75a)
= −
∑
xˆAˆr
:
s.t. ∃xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
∑
xˆBˆr
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
|Gσ |
©­­­«
1
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS
′, 1, σ)
ª®®®¬
log
©­­­«
1
|WG
xˆAˆr
,σ
|
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ)
ª®®®¬ (75b)
=
1
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
∑
xˆAˆr
:
s.t. ∃xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
∑
xˆBˆr
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ) log |W
G
xˆAˆr
,σ |
−
1
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
∑
xˆAˆr
:
s.t. ∃xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
∑
xˆBˆr
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ) log
©­­­«
∑
xˆS′ ∈W
G
xˆ
Aˆr
,σ
p(xˆ Bˆr | xˆS′, 1, σ)
ª®®®¬ .
(75c)
Note that in (75a), we only need to sum over xˆAˆr where where
exists some xˆS′ ∈ W
G
xˆAˆr
,σ
, because we impose the condition
that Dˆ = 1; the rest give p(xˆAˆr |1, σ) = 0.
To calculate H(X ′
B′r
|X ′
A′r
), we first find p(x ′
A′r
) and
p(x ′
B′r
|x ′
A′r
).
p(x ′A′r
) =
∑
x′
S′
∈X′
S
p(x ′
S′
, x ′A′r
) (76a)
=
∑
x
′
S′
∈W
x
′
A′r
p(x ′
S′
) (76b)
=
∑
x′
S′
∈W
x
′
A′r
∩Gσ
p(x ′
S′
) +
∑
x
′
S′
∈W
x
′
A′r
∩Gcσ
p(x ′
S′
) (76c)
=
∑
x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
1
|XS′ |
+
∑
x′
S′
∈WB
x
′
A′r
,σ
1
|XS′ |
(76d)
=
|WG
x′
A′r
,σ
|
|XS′ |
+ ǫ ′
x′
A′r
,σ
, (76e)
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where ǫ ′
x′
A′r
,σ
def
=
|WB
x
′
A′r
,σ
|
|XS′ |
≤ ǫ ′. Also note that p(x ′
A′r
) =
1/|XA′r | as the messages are uniformly distributed in N
′.
p(x ′B′r
|x ′A′r
) =
1
p(x ′
A′r
)
∑
x
′
S′
∈X′
S
p(x ′
S′
, x ′A′r
)p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
, x ′A′r
)
=
1
p(x ′
A′r
)
∑
x′
S′
∈W
x
′
A′r
p(x ′
S′
)p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
, x ′A′r
)
=
1
p(x ′
A′r
)
∑
x′
S′
∈W
x
′
A′r
1
|XS′ |
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
=
1
p(x ′
A′r
)
1
|XS′ |
( ∑
x
′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
def
=C
+
∑
x′
S′
∈WB
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
def
=D
)
.
Now,
H(X ′B′r
|X ′A′r
)
= −
∑
x
′
A′r
∑
x
′
B′r
p(x ′A′r
)p(x ′B′r
|x ′A′r
) log p(x ′B′r
|x ′A′r
) (78a)
≥ −
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
p(x ′A′r
)p(x ′B′r
|x ′A′r
) log p(x ′B′r
|x ′A′r
)
(78b)
= −
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
1
|XS′ |
(C + D) log p(x ′B′r |x
′
A′r
) (78c)
≥ −
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log p(x ′B′r |x
′
A′r
) (78d)
= −
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log
C + D
p(x ′
A′r
)|XS′ |
(78e)
=
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log
(
|WG
x′
A′r
,σ
| + ǫ ′
x
′
A′r
,σ
|XS′ |
)
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log(C + D) (78f)
≥
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log |WG
x′
A′r
,σ
|
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log(C + D) (78g)
=
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
C log |WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
|
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
C logC
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
C log(1 + D/C) (78h)
≥
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
C log |WG
x′
A′r
,σ
|
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
C logC
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
C(log e)
D
C
(78i)
=
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
log |WG
x′
A′r
,σ
|
−
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
log
∑
x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
− log e
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
D
︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
def
=E
, (78j)
where
(78b) is obtained as we take a subset over which the first
summation is evaluated;
(78i) follow from x ≥ ln(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0;
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Now,
E =
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
∑
x′
S′
∈Wxˆ
Aˆr
∩Gcσ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
(79a)
≤
1
|XS′ |
∑
x′
A′r
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈Wxˆ
Aˆr
∩Gcσ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
) (79b)
=
1
|XS′ |
∑
x
′
B′r
∑
x′
S′
∈Gcσ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
) (79c)
=
1
|XS′ |
|Gcσ | (79d)
= ǫ ′, (79e)
where
(79c) follows asWa andWb do not overlap for a , b; (79d) is
obtained by noting that p(x ′
B′r
|x ′
S′
) is a deterministic function
of x ′
S′
.
So, combining (31), (75c) and (78j), and (80b), we have
H(XˆBˆr | XˆAˆr , Dˆ = 1, Xˆb = σ) − H(X
′
B′r
|X ′A′r )
≤ ǫ ′ log e +
ǫ ′
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x′
B′r
∑
x
′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r |x
′
S′
) log |WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
|
−
ǫ ′
(1 − ǫ ′)|XS′ |
∑
x
′
A′r
:
s.t. ∃x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
∑
x
′
B′r
∑
x′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)
log
∑
x
′
S′
∈WG
x
′
A′r
,σ
p(x ′B′r
|x ′
S′
)) (80a)
≤ ǫ ′ log e +
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(
E log e + H(X ′B′r
|X ′A′r
)
)
(80b)
≤
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(
(1 − ǫ ′) log e + ǫ ′ log e + H(X ′E′)
)
(80c)
≤
ǫ ′
1 − ǫ ′
(log e + nˆ) , (80d)
where (80b) follows from multiplying (78j) with ǫ ′/(1 − ǫ ′).

